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   EMU strategies: Lessons from Greece in view of EU 
enlargement1 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper, after reviewing briefly the early steps of European monetary 
integration and key elements of the EMU project as reflected in the 
Treaty of Maastricht, analyses the monetary integration strategy and 
convergence experience of member states, notably that of Greece, in the 
1990s which led to the adoption of the euro. From this analysis, a 
number of key lessons are drawn which may be useful to future 
candidates to euro membership -in view of the enlargement- in designing 
their economic and monetary convergence strategies. In this context, the 
role of ERM II is examined, while particular attention is paid to policy 
issues, and risks, associated with the free movement of capital. The 
paper concludes that the existing Community institutions, rules and 
mechanisms provide a helpful framework to guide the convergence effort 
of accession countries towards EMU and ensure the implementation of 
sound economic policies thereafter.  
 
 
1.Early steps in European Monetary Integration  
 
The Werner Plan and the ‘Snake’ 
  
 Practical efforts at monetary cooperation among member states of the 
European Community started in 1971 as part of a plan to adopt a single 
currency within a decade. Subsequent to political direction given in the 
EC Summit meeting of The Hague, in December 1969, a High Level 
Group under Pierre Werner, Prime Minister of Luxembourg prepared a 
programme for achieving EMU, in three stages. A key aspect of the 
programme was the ‘parallelism’ between developments in economic and 
monetary policy co-ordination and progress towards political union.  
 
International economic and monetary developments at the time were 
seen as elements supporting such an initiative. The mounting tensions 
in the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the growing 
                                            
1 The present analysis applies to all Member States, candidates for euro membership. It 
is, however, particularly relevant to acceding countries on the basis of the issues 
treated in the paper. 
Helpful comments by G.Tavlas, I.Sabethai and H.Gibson on an earlier version of the 
paper are gratefully acknowledged. Also, C.Catiforis provided assistance in the 
preparation of the paper. Of course, full responsibility for the paper is with the author. 
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instability of the international monetary system, stimulated member 
states’ interest in progress towards EMU.  
 
In March 1971, the Council gave its approval to the introduction of EMU 
in three stages. The Council invited the central banks of the Member 
States ‘from the beginning of the first stage, and on experimental basis, to 
hold exchange rate fluctuations between the currencies of Member States 
within margins narrower than those resulting from the application of the 
margins in force for the US dollar, by means of concerted action with 
respect to that currency’.  In April 1972, the “Basle Agreement” between 
EC central bank governors was concluded, giving birth to the “Snake” by 
which the margin of fluctuation between participating currencies would 
be limited to 2.25%2.  
 
 With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system3 and the highly unstable 
international economic environment, further progress towards EMU 
proved to be extremely difficult. Compliance with the ‘Snake’s’ exchange 
rate commitments was weak, and quitting it was frequent4. However, in 
assessing this performance, the economic framework at the time has 
also to be taken into account. The oil price increases5 sharply 
aggravated inflationary pressures and balance of payments problems. 
Such problems were more acute in some member states, depending 
mainly on the economic policies followed and reactions to external 
shocks.  
 
Although the Werner Plan was not implemented as scheduled, it 
nevertheless left a valuable legacy in terms of institutions and 
mechanisms. The exchange rate commitments, together with the credit 
facilities and the legislative framework laid down the framework for 
further steps towards monetary integration. 
 
The European Monetary System 
 
Efforts to establish an area of monetary stability were renewed at the 
end of the seventies. At the instigation of France and Germany, the 
creation of the European Monetary System was decided in December 
1978 and started operating in March 1979. According to the conclusion 
of the European Council of 4 and 5 December of 1978:  
 
                                            
2 The agreement remained in force until the setting up of the EMS on 13 March 1979.  
3 In August 1971, the dollar was declared inconvertible, marking the end of the Bretton 
Woods system established in 1944 and involving the pegging of currencies (the Bretton 
Woods system involved the US dollar pegged to gold, and the other currencies pegged 
to the dollar). 
4 It can be noted, indicatively, that Italy withdrew from the “Snake” in February 1973, 
while France withdrew in January 1974, rejoined in July 1975 and abandoned the 
“Snake” definitively in March 1976. Denmark and the UK joined in May 1972 only to 
withdraw in June (Denmark rejoined in October of the same year).   
5 Due to the first oil shock, in 1973. 
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‘the purpose of the European Monetary System is to establish a greater 
measure of monetary stability in the Community. It should be seen as a 
fundamental component of a more comprehensive strategy aimed at 
lasting growth with stability, a progressive return to full employment, the 
harmonisation of living standards and the lessening of regional disparities 
in the Community…’.  
 
The EMS was based on the concept of fixed, but adjustable exchange 
rates and had two main components: the Exchange Rate Mechanism, 
ERM, and the European Currency Unit, ECU. The ERM set a central 
exchange rate towards the ECU for each participating currency. On the 
basis of such rates, bilateral “central rates” were established. The 
fluctuation margins around bilateral central rates were fixed at 2.25% 
for all currencies except the Italian lira for which it was set at 6%.  
 
During the first eight years of its operation, the EMS had seen 
realignments every year. After the 1987 re-alignment, the system was 
supported by improved convergence of prices and costs and behaved as 
a quasi-monetary union, without currency realignments until 1992. 
Nevertheless, with the passage of the years since 1987, deteriorations in 
competitive positions and cumulative inflation differentials began to 
build up, particularly in countries initially respecting the wider margins. 
These economic developments, combined with uncertainties related to 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty6, led to EMS disruption by a 
currency crisis during 1992-93. The British pound and the Italian lira 
left the ERM in September 1992, and in November of the same year the 
Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo were devalued by 6% against 
the other currencies. In January 1993 the Irish pound was devalued by 
10%. In May the peseta and the escudo were again devalued. 
 
In an effort to restore currency stability and remove potential ‘one-way 
bets’ facing speculative investors, the decision was taken to widen 
temporarily the ERM margins to +-15% from 2 August 1993. Germany 
and the Netherlands agreed bilaterally to keep their currencies within 
the +- 2.25% margins. 
 
Despite the problems encountered and its shortcomings, the EMS 
achieved, to a large extent, its main objectives. Countries participating 
in the ERM achieved a zone of increasing monetary stability in parallel 
with gradual relaxation of capital controls. The EMS responded to 
changing conditions in the financial environment by strengthening its 
mechanisms, as was the case with the Basle/Nyborg agreement7. It 
provided also valuable lessons for designing the further steps of 
economic and monetary union and served as a starting point for higher 
                                            
6 Following the rejection of the Treaty in Denmark and difficulties in its ratification in 
France. 
7 Refers to decisions taken by the Governors Committee in Basle, and approved by the 
Ecofin at Nyborg, aimed at strengthening the rules governing the operation of the EMS 
[12.9.1987].   
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co-ordination of monetary policy, providing also the basis for multilateral 
surveillance in the Community. On a more technical level, the ERM 
crisis confirmed that interventions alone –whether intra-marginal or at 
the margin- have limited effectiveness in containing tensions if markets 
perceive them as being of a lasting character. Timely increases in 
interest rates remain the most effective course to counter market 
pressure. However, if interest rates have to be kept at very high levels 
over a prolonged period of time, they may not be sustainable in the light 
of domestic economic and financial conditions. 
 
 
2. EMU: a regime change in Europe’s money 
 
A key development, which underlined the need for further steps towards 
monetary integration, was the liberalization of capital movements within 
the Community8. Free movement of capital made the EMS more difficult 
to manage in the absence of the stabilizing influence of a concrete 
programme, and a timetable, towards monetary union. In this context, 
the 1992-93 ERM crisis worked as a catalyst, strengthening member 
states resolve to pursue progress towards monetary union on the basis 
of the EMU project of the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
The EMU project, comprising well-determined objectives, institutions, 
policy instruments and deadlines, clearly constituted a regime change 
marking an important qualitative improvement compared with previous 
Community monetary arrangements. Weak elements of the pre-1992 
EMS, and in general of previous Community monetary arrangements, 
were the absence of clear objectives and appropriate institutions –
notably a European central bank- and mechanisms to achieve them.  
 
Monetary Union, involving a single currency issued by an independent 
Central Bank, whose principal mandate is to ensure price stability, was 
therefore clearly a superior regime to preceding Community monetary 
arrangements which were pursuing exchange rate stability within the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS.  
 
The EMU project benefited, in most of the cases, from the strong 
commitment and support of governments, the business community and 
European citizens. Also, the large cost of non-participation in this major 
project from the start, as perceived notably by founding members of the 
European Community, helped mobilize domestic constituencies in 
support of EMU. 
 
The importance of the qualitative change involved in the EMU project, 
reflected in an enhanced credibility of the whole exercise, becomes 
                                            
8 The capital movements directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 stipulated complete 
liberalisation of capital movements by 1 July 1990, with some temporary derogations 
for Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. 
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evident if one compares the currency crises within the ‘Snake’ and the 
EMS, with the rather smooth transition to the euro of the eleven 
currencies in 1999 and, subsequently, of the Greek drachma. The 1992-
93 crisis can be seen as the last major currency turbulence of the old 
system before the drive towards the single currency was firmly on track. 
Once the political and institutional situation concerning the candidate 
countries for the monetary union was clarified9, the convergence process 
had been generally smooth, streamlined within a reformed ERM. 
 
The Community institutional framework, which helped member states 
formulate, test and adapt their economic policies, was the reformed10 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS from August 1993 until the end of 
1998. From the start of the third stage of EMU, the 1st January 1999, 
ERM II has been the framework which guides the policies of candidate 
countries for euro-area membership. The operation of the reformed EMS 
and ERM II should be also seen within the broader Community 
economic policy provisions and rules, which encourage and support the 
design and implementation of sound economic and financial policies11.  
 
In conclusion, EMU supplied the necessary focus, during the 1990s, to 
prospective members enabling them to mobilize broad support and 
overcome difficulties in pursuing this major objective of monetary union. 
If that objective were missing, it would have been very difficult to obtain 
such a broad support, as past experience had shown. Euro area 
membership provides a similar -and even stronger- incentive for 
acceding countries, as it is now the reality of the euro, and not simply a 
project, which is the objective to attain.  
 
 
3. Lessons from convergence experiences  
 
An essential element of the strategy towards EMU pursued by EU 
member states within their convergence programmes was its 
comprehensive character. The respect of the exchange rate stability 
criterion -within the specified fluctuation bands- was not pursued in 
isolation, but as one component of a coherent approach incorporating 
targets for the government balance and debt, the inflation rate and the 
interest rate12.  
 
                                            
9 The Maastricht Treaty entered into force on 1.11.1993, after ratification by all 
member states [Denmark ratified the Treaty, following a positive second referendum in 
May 1993, after having obtained an opt out of participation in the final stage of EMU 
and a common defense policy]. 
10 Involving wider fluctuation margins of 15%.  
11 These provisions are the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (Article 99 of the EC 
Treaty), the Multilateral Surveillance, the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Prohibition 
against assuming the commitments of other Member States and Prohibition of 
privileged access (covered by articles 98 to 104 of the Treaty).  
12 In addition to four convergence criteria, qualification for euro membership requires 
also central bank independence (Article 121 of Treaty).   
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Macroeconomic, monetary and financial policies were supported by 
structural reforms of the labour, goods and capital markets. However, the 
implementation of such reforms was not always satisfactory and 
adaptations proved necessary, in several cases, in particular through the 
strengthening of adjustment measures in order to keep the convergence 
momentum and make possible the achievement of the objectives set. 
 
Of particular interest is the convergence effort of Greece, which was the 
first successful attempt by a member state to join the euro area after the 
first wave of the 11 founding members. Such a single effort involved 
increased difficulties to manage the convergence operation, both 
because the “distance” Greece had to cover in order to comply with the 
convergence criteria was significantly greater than was the case for most 
of the other member states but, also, because in the case of the eleven 
member states of the first wave the risks involved in their convergence 
operation were “pooled” 13 within the joint effort.   
 
A number of lessons can be drawn from Greece’s successful convergence 
strategy to join the euro area from 1 January 2001: 
 
• (i). The right setting of priorities in achieving nominal convergence, 
taking into account the situation regarding the convergence 
criteria, available policy instruments to achieve the goals set, and 
the time-horizon for the planned convergence. More specifically, in 
1995, when a new thrust was given by the Greek authorities to the 
convergence effort, it was decided that a rapid disinflation of the 
economy was central to the convergence effort. Inflation was high, 
at around 11% in 1994, and its steady fall conditioned the 
progress to meeting the rest of the convergence criteria, notably 
the exchange rate stability criterion and the government deficit 
criterion, given the high government debt ratio and, therefore, the 
high interest payments. The “hard drachma policy”, by which the 
exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor, was at the centre of 
the disinflation operation from the double digit figure of 1994 to 
euro qualification inflation levels of 199914, and was an essential 
element of the whole macroeconomic and budgetary adjustment 
effort as was specified in Greece’s convergence programmes15.  
                                            
13 There were, indeed, no notable cases of speculative attacks against currencies of the 
eleven countries during the crucial two-year period before adopting the euro on 
1.1.1999. This can be largely attributed to both progress achieved in meeting the 
convergence criteria and the high political commitment to the EMU project, a situation 
that deterred speculators from attacking the currencies of the countries of the first 
wave. 
14 More information about Greece’s monetary policy strategy during that period is 
provided in Annex 2, drawing on “Garganas N. and Tavlas G.” (2001).  
 
15 Greece presented a revised convergence programme for the period 1994-99 in June 
1994, which was subsequently updated in 1997, 1998 and 1999. From 2000 onwards, 
after joining the euro area, Greece started presenting a stability programme, updated 
annually. 
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• (ii). A safety margin was maintained when reducing interest rates 
in order to keep the yield of drachma denominated assets 
attractive to domestic and international investors and ensure 
orderly convergence to euro area interest rates (Graphs 3 and 4). 
Such a policy16 was also compatible with the disinflation strategy. 
 
• (iii). The appropriate sequence of capital movements liberalization 
was followed (tested in many occasions and in several countries) 
involving first, long-term and trade-related capital movements and 
last, purely financial operations17. This approach, combined with 
the safety margin maintained in reducing interest rates, 
contributed to avoiding reversals in capital movement 
liberalization. Such reversals, whenever they occurred elsewhere 
in the world, proved very damaging for the credibility of economic 
policies. 
 
• (iv). The liberalization of capital movements was implemented in 
parallel with the strengthening of the financial system, through 
reforms and adaptations of the legislative and regulatory 
framework to Community legislation and by improving the 
supervision of banking and capital markets. 
 
• (v). There was no significant uncovered foreign currency exposure 
of the corporate sector, although borrowing in foreign currency 
increased significantly since 1995 (Graph 11), as foreign currency 
borrowing was covered, to a large extent, through “natural 
hedging” i.e. by receipts in foreign currency, mainly by companies 
engaged in tourist, shipping and other export-oriented activities. 
 
• (vi). The Greek drachma entered the ERM once substantial 
progress had been achieved towards nominal convergence. Entry 
into the ERM was effected at a central rate involving a 12.3% 
devaluation of the drachma against the ECU, a development that 
enabled recuperation of competitiveness losses due to the hard 
drachma policy. Furthermore, Greece agreed that the stabilization 
and structural reform efforts had to be strengthened in order to 
contain the inflationary impact of the devaluation and complete 
the remaining distance to meeting the convergence criteria. 
Indeed, entry of the Drachma to the ERM, in March 1998, was 
accompanied by a programme agreed with the Greek government 
including reinforcement of the adjustment effort in public finances 
as well as structural reforms in order to improve the performance 
of the economy. 
                                            
16 Although not explicitly stated, such prudent policy of interest rates reduction was 
followed in practice, and proved appropriate in considerably limiting disruptive capital 
flows and avoiding reversals in the capital movements liberalisation process. 
17 The liberalisation of capital movements was completed in May 1994 with the removal 
of the last restrictions on short-term capital movements. 
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• (vii). A crucial aspect of the convergence effort of Greece was the 
fact that economic activity remained relatively high enabling the 
authorities to maintain the “hard drachma” policy and high 
interest rates to support such a policy, without serious adverse 
effects on the economy (Graph 2). This development was mainly 
the result of the credibility of policies, which made possible 
declines in nominal and real interest rates (despite occasional 
rises in short-term rates) and the maintenance of a stable 
economic environment and positive prospects. Also, important was 
the contribution of Community funds to real GDP growth18. 
 
• (viii). The credibility of the convergence objective and the 
determination for euro membership was reflected in wage 
moderation in the private sector19, a phenomenon noted also in 
other EU countries in their drive to EMU. This development can be 
attributed to the desire of social partners to preserve 
competitiveness and employment in the European monetary 
union, realizing that the devaluation option would not be available 
anymore. 
 
• (ix). The broad political support for the EMU project was important. 
The support of the large majority of the Greek political parties and 
public opinion was an important positive factor in stabilizing 
expectations and deterring speculation in difficult times. It should 
be noted in this respect that in the past, sharply diverging views of 
main political parties on the EMU project was a destabilizing 
factor for the currency in some Member States. In general, strong 
political support for the project -based on the broad support of 
public opinion- has proved decisive in avoiding speculative attacks 
or in fending off such attacks when they occurred. 
 
 
4.The ERM II as a framework for guiding convergence  
 
Acceding countries will enter the EU as Member States with a 
derogation. This means, inter alia, that they are expected to join ERM II, 
                                            
18 Convergence of Acceding Countries’ economies to the EU average will be also 
supported by funds allocated through the Community budget. At the Copenhagen 
Council on 13 December 2002, agreement was reached on the package of financial 
measures proposed for the entry of the new member states. In all, the financial 
package for the years 2004-2006 amounts to some 41 billion euros in commitments for 
the new members for infrastructure, agricultural and internal institution building 
programmes. Discussion on the post-2006 financial perspective for the EU will start in 
2004.  
19 Wage developments in the private sector were also influenced by wage moderation in 
the public sector, as incomes policy served as an example for wage agreements in the 
private sector. 
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although not necessarily immediately after accession, and eventually the 
euro20.   
 
This section reviews a number of key aspects of ERM II and draws a 
number of, tentative, conclusions about its expected role in guiding 
acceding countries in their drive to EMU, on the basis of past experience 
from the operation of the mechanism under its various forms, taking 
account of the present Community institutional framework and other 
relevant factors. 
 
ERM II was established by a Resolution of the European Council in 
Amsterdam in 199721, as a replacement for the European Monetary 
System as from 1 January 1999. The Central Bank Agreement of 1st 
September 1998 lays down the operating procedures of the mechanism. 
ERM II is based on a central rate of the participating currencies against 
the euro, with standard fluctuation bands of +- 15%, although narrower 
bands can be agreed. Central rates, fluctuation bands and realignments 
are set by common procedure involving Finance Ministers, the ECB and 
NCB Governors and the Commission. Interventions at the margins by 
the ECB and the central bank concerned will in principle be automatic 
and unlimited, unless they are deemed to conflict with the price stability 
objective.  
 
ERM II should be seen as a mechanism testing the consistency of policies, 
encouraging necessary adjustment and helping to achieve convergence. 
It provides both more flexibility and stability compared with earlier 
versions of the mechanism; with the wider fluctuation bands it offers 
more policy flexibility and acts as a buffer against one-way bets, 
discouraging speculative attacks (For further analysis on the use of 
fluctuation bands in assessing compliance with the exchange rate 
criterion see Box in the next page); it offers also more stability as the 
objective of euro membership, made credible by appropriate economic 
policies and Community multilateral surveillance mechanisms, supports 
convergence efforts.  
 
ERM II rules are flexible enough so that they can accommodate a number 
of exchange rate regimes followed by acceding countries (a summary of 
exchange rate regimes in accession countries in Annex 5). However, 
some regimes have been already identified at this stage as incompatible 
with ERM II namely free floating, crawling peg and exchange rates fixed 
to currency other than the euro. In particular, currency board regimes 
linked to the euro could, in principle, be accepted as special 
                                            
20 “Member States shall treat exchange rate policies as a matter of common interest” 
(article 124 of the Treaty). This notably includes avoidance of competitive devaluation 
and implementation of appropriate economic and financial policies. 
21 Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an exchange rate 
mechanism in the third stage of economic and monetary union; Amsterdam, 16 June 
1997, OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 5. 
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arrangements within the ERM II fluctuation bands22. Unilateral 
euroization is not considered compatible with the Treaty23. 
 
 
Box 
 
               ERM II: Narrow or broad bands are relevant? 
 
How are the arguments about greater flexibility of ERM II reconciled with the 
alleged position of the European Commission that acceding countries should 
respect the narrow margins of 2.25% vis-a-vis the euro (see article by 
Ch.Wyplosz: ‘Do not impose a currency crisis on Europe’ referring to 
announcements by  Commissioner P.Solbes on this issue)?  A tentative answer 
is as follows: ERM II provides, indeed, greater flexibility compared to earlier, 
more rigid versions of the mechanism. The Commission’s views on this issue 
seem to be more nuanced than those reported in the above article and in the 
press and, broadly, in line with its position taken in convergence reports on 
Greece in 2000 and, previously, on the eleven founding members of the euro in 
1998. For the sake of equal treatment, the same approach should apply in the 
case of the new member states (and of course to existing members, for example 
in the case of Sweden). The Commission’s position, in sum, seems to be that, 
taking account of the 15% fluctuation margins defined in the ERM II 
Resolution, an assessment has to be made in each case about the “exchange 
rate stability” requirement stipulated in the Treaty, as well as that of “avoiding 
severe tensions”, a situation related to currency devaluation.  If a currency has 
stayed within the 2.25% fluctuation margin from its central rate during the 
relevant two-year period, it can be assumed that the requirements of exchange 
rate stability and absence of severe tensions are met. In the event of 
depreciation greater than the 2.25%, there will be no automatic presumption of 
instability or severe tensions, but an examination of other relevant aspects will 
be made in order to form a judgment on these issues. As was also the case in 
past assessments, exchange rate movements above the 2.25% margin (i.e. 
involving an appreciation) would be acceptable.  In conclusion, there is 
adequate scope for judgement in each case, while respecting the provisions of 
the Treaty and the ERM II Resolution regarding the exchange rate criterion. 
 
 
 
The guiding principle which should govern the EU approach to acceding 
countries’ exchange rate strategies within ERM II, is that their exchange 
rate regimes must be adapted to the requirements of the ERM II and not 
vice versa. In practice, this would imply that although every effort 
should be made to accommodate specific exchange rate regimes (such 
as, for example, euro-based currency board regimes which have proven 
                                            
22 The ECB does not consider currency boards to be a substitute for participation in 
the ERM II but rather as a unilateral commitment on the part of the countries 
concerned, specifying that such arrangements will be assessed on a case-by-case basis 
(in ECB’s paper “Policy position of the Governing Council of the ECB on exchange rate 
issues relating to the Acceding Countries”, 18.12.2003, scheduled for publication]. This 
position seems to be the same as those of the Commission and the Ecofin Council on 
this specific issue, only articulated in more detail. 
23 See ECOFIN report, Athens, 5 April 2003.  
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their sustainability) this must be done on the condition that these 
regimes are supported by appropriate economic and financial policies 
agreed by all parties concerned. This would preserve both the credibility 
of the mechanism and the long-term interest of the country concerned.  
Acceding countries have made significant progress towards a fully-
fledged open economy system, in reforming the economic and financial 
system and the institutions in general and in liberalizing capital 
movements. However, the sustainability of these reforms have not yet 
been tested under the competitive pressure implied by the full 
membership in the EU and, further, under the rigorous framework of 
ERM II. This is an additional reason why the convergence effort, 
including structural reforms, must be designed and implemented with 
care in connection with the timing of ERM II entry and the length of stay 
in the mechanism. 
 
The timing of entry into ERM II is a key issue in the convergence process. 
It may be useful in tackling this sensitive issue to examine, first, the 
substance of the needed adjustment and then see what would be, in 
each case, the optimal timing of entry. It is evident that the first period 
of EU membership will be the time to introduce/complement necessary 
reforms24 in key markets and institutions and test the capacity of the 
economy to implement them successfully. In a second period, policies 
and reforms will be corrected or/and strengthened in the light of the 
experience gained during the first period and of external developments. 
The whole (first plus second) period could be about five years, and may 
be shorter or longer depending on the situation in each country.  
 
The above period(s) of adjustment and reform could coincide, fully or 
partly, with that of ERM II participation. The criteria for such 
participation would be both, the interest of the member state concerned 
and, also, the need to preserve the credibility of the ERM II. In practice, 
this requires a sufficient degree of progress towards sustainable 
convergence, ensuring that the objective of meeting the convergence 
criteria remains on track25.  
 
This second part of the adjustment effort, which could correspond to the 
final stage of ERM II participation, should represent the conditions that 
will, in general, prevail in the euro area. It is, as a consequence, 
important that ERM II membership not be seen as a waiting room for 
euro-area membership, but as a useful framework providing the 
opportunity to make valuable adjustments and introduce reforms which 
would form the basis for real convergence and sustainable nominal 
convergence. This is the reason why in some cases, notably if the 
                                            
24 Such reforms could be introduced before entering ERM II. Indeed, in some cases this 
could present an optimal situation both for the credibility of the system and for the 
medium to long term interest of the country concerned 
25 As was seen above, this was the approach followed by Greece.  
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success of certain major reforms is uncertain, early participation in the 
ERM II may not be an optimal option. 
 
In conclusion, if the following elements are in place:   
• clear definition of policy priorities in connection with the 
convergence criteria 
• sustainability of policies and adequacy of budgetary resources for 
their implementation, and 
• commitment to implement the adjustment and reform programme 
 
then experience shows us that a country will be able to participate 
successfully in ERM II. On the other hand, if the member state 
concerned feels that a higher degree of freedom in setting priorities is 
preferred or/and no consensus exists for the implementation of major 
reforms, it may be better to delay the entry into the ERM II. 
 
How long should a country stay in the ERM II? There is no a 
predetermined, optimal duration period for such participation, between 
the two-year legal minimum and a longer time period. Even more than in 
the case of the timing of ERM II entry, examined above, the decisive 
element should be that adequate progress was made by the member-
state concerned in achieving sustainable convergence26. . However, the 
participation period should not be too long as, in such a case, there is a 
risk that convergence momentum is lost and the commitment to the 
euro fades. It is, therefore, necessary that the convergence effort keeps 
its momentum and once a critical mass of reform and convergence 
progress has been achieved, entry to ERM II may be sought. As was 
already noted, this requires a careful design of the convergence effort, 
notably the setting of priorities and policy instruments to achieve them, 
thus avoiding any reversals in the convergence effort. 
 
The provision concerning conditional intervention27 was considered by 
some analysts as introducing uncertainties about the ECB’s 
commitment to defending ERM II central rates28. However, this provision 
is a direct consequence of ECB’s mandate defined in the Treaty to give 
priority in maintaining price stability. As a consequence, the provision 
about conditional intervention should be interpreted as implying that 
the ECB would, in general, intervene to defend a specific central parity 
provided that the country concerned follows the economic and financial 
                                            
26 A high degree of sustainable convergence is an objective explicitly mentioned in the 
relevant Treaty provisions (convergence criteria) and as essential element for 
sustainable exchange rate stability in the ERM II Resolution. 
27 “Intervention at the margins will in principle be automatic and unlimited. However, 
the ECB and the central banks of the other participants could suspend intervention if 
this were to conflict with their primary objective”. Resolution on the establishment of 
the ERM II. 
28 A.Folsz (2003), for example, argues that “the defensive system would be stronger if 
the commitment of the ECB to intervene was free of all uncertainties”.  
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policies agreed through the ERM II framework, or adaptations to these 
policies decided with the same procedures.  
 
A specific issue concerns the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect, namely 
whether the ERM II provides enough flexibility to allow for an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate resulting from higher productivity 
in the trade-goods sector in high growth, catching-up economies.  
It emerges from the examination of the provisions of the 
mechanism, as well as past assessments of compliance with 
convergence criteria, that the ERM II, indeed, provides enough flexibility 
to accommodate phenomena of nominal appreciation (which may result 
from higher productivity growth of the tradable sector, or for other 
reasons) as this would not be an obstacle in meeting the requirements of 
the exchange rate convergence criterion29.   
 
Probably more important than the possibility of accommodating the 
eventual B-S effect through a currency appreciation is the capacity of 
new member states to adjust the exchange rate through a depreciation 
in order to recover lost competitiveness, in the event of price increases 
not justified by productivity growth. Although such adjustments could 
be made within ERM II, sizeable exchange rate adjustments might better 
be made before the currency in question enters the mechanism (see, 
also, the discussion about the timing of ERM II entry, above). 
 
Concerning fiscal adjustment, new member states must respect the 
provisions of the Treaty about general government balances and debt 
ratios, as well as those of the Stability and Growth Pact about a 
budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus in the medium 
term30. A key issue is how these obligations can be reconciled with the 
need for most of acceding countries to undertake important investment 
projects in order to improve infrastructure and make progress towards 
                                            
29 Real appreciation could be realised through nominal appreciation, increased 
inflation or a combination of both. A nominal appreciation is considered as complying 
with the exchange rate criterion of the Treaty, following an interpretation applied in the 
1998 and 2000 convergence reports of the EMI (1998), the ECB (2000) and the 
Commission (1998 and 2000). On the other hand, higher inflation due to wage 
equalization across tradable and non-tradable sectors could pose a problem. However, 
the size of such an effect should not be overestimated. According to J. Von Hagen and 
J.Zhou (2003) the inflation differentials between EU and accession CEE countries 
attributed to the B-S effect (estimated in the literature between 1 and 4% in each year) 
should be qualified, as a number of factors may reduce such an effect a) The B-S effect 
is a long-run tendency, which may be less prominent over a shorter time horizon, b) 
productivity growth of the service sector, which is the main constituent of the non-
tradable sector, can be very fast in the accession countries, as it is developing 
essentially from a very low starting level, c) productivity growth of the tradable sector 
will gradually lose its momentum as it reaches higher level, and d) the pressure of high 
unemployment rates may prevent the wage rate from equalizing at a level compatible 
with tradable-sector productivity growth.   
30 It is recalled that the SGP applies to all member states of the EU. However, member 
states that have not yet adopted the euro cannot be subject to the possible sanctions 
provided for by the Treaty.   
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real convergence. This is, indeed, one crucial aspect of the adjustment 
process of new member states and underlines how important it is that 
they pursue a policy of sound public finance, controlling current 
primary expenditure so that adequate budgetary resources can be 
allocated to the necessary investment in order to improve infrastructure. 
It suggests also the need to consider carefully the strategy of 
convergence towards EMU, the right setting of priorities and the timing 
of ERM II membership and accession to the euro area.  
How do Commission proposals for fiscal consolidation, as  
approved by the Council31, affect acceding countries convergence 
strategy? The proposals aim was to clarify certain provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact and put the focus on the cyclically-adjusted 
fiscal balance as well as the long-term sustainability of public finances32. 
They are helpful to the acceding countries by putting the emphasis on 
sustainable fiscal adjustment, including through structural reforms 
which raise the growth potential of the economy, and on the need of 
running down public debt at a satisfactory pace towards the 60% of GDP 
reference value (this approach increases the margin of action of the 
acceding countries as their government debt ratio was estimated, on 
average, at 42% of GDP in 2003, much lower than that of the EU 
average, 64% of GDP). 
 
A related issue to fiscal consolidation is whether macroeconomic 
stabilization, pursued in order to achieve the nominal convergence 
criteria, is also compatible with real convergence i.e. the capacity to 
obtain, in parallel, high enough rates of real GDP growth rates in order 
to maintain progress towards real convergence. The example of Greece 
examined above showed that the two processes can be mutually re-
enforcing, notably if the process of nominal convergence acquires 
enhanced credibility affecting the formation of key variables such as 
interest rates, wages and prices.  
 
The “exit strategy” is a key issue of exchange rate arrangements in 
relation to ERM II membership. The issues covered under this concept 
concern both exit from current exchange rate regimes to ERM II and 
from ERM II to the euro. In analyzing this issue, a number of situations 
can be distinguished:  
a) currency board arrangements, CB, based on the euro,  
b) pegs to the euro, and  
c) managed float and free float regimes.  
 
                                            
31 Commission Communication on “Strengthening the co-ordination of budgetary 
policies”, COM(2002) 670 final, 27.11.2002 and decision of ECOFIN Council of 7 March 
2003. 
32 As was noted both by the Commission and the Ecofin Council, these clarifications 
were made within the framework established by the Treaty (article 104, on excessive 
deficits) and secondary legislation in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
“Code of conduct” on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes.  
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The above situations involve large differences, concerning also the policy 
options available in each case. For example, CB regimes can find their 
place in the ERM II as arrangements involving (very) narrow fluctuation 
bands, provided that the corresponding central rate in each case is 
judged appropriate. “Pegs to the euro” regimes can fall more easily in the 
normal fluctuation bands of +-15% of the ERM, notably if they have 
been shadowing ERM II fluctuation bands already. “Managed” and “free 
float” regimes can also be relatively easily adapted to the ERM II rules 
provided that they are supported by appropriate policies. Despite the 
differences that exist in the above situations, the basic policy requirement 
for ERM II participation is, in all cases, the same: an appropriate and 
sustainable central rate must be chosen in each individual case, 
supported by the right economic and monetary policies. This basic 
requirement must guide decisions on central rates, including in those 
cases where the continuation of the pre-ERM II exchange rate regimes 
seems attractive, in view of the complications of alternative solutions.33  
 Regarding, exit from the ERM II to the euro, it seems advisable to 
follow the same approach adopted in the case of the eleven member 
states in 1998 and, subsequently, of Greece in 2000: when the Council 
decided that these countries fulfilled the convergence criteria, the 
conversion rate of each currency was also determined34. Any other 
option (e.g. postponing decision on conversion rates until the last day 
before entry in the euro area) would increase uncertainty about the 
sustainability of central rates, inciting speculative attacks in the 
currencies. 
 
 
                                           
5.Capital Mobility and ERM II: an adversary or an ally in 
the drive to euro membership? 
 
This chapter examines, on the basis of existing evidence, firstly, the 
policies by which the risks of destabilising capital movements can be 
 
33 This last remark, referring notably to CB regimes, does not necessarily imply that the 
merits of the continuation of existing parities should be overlooked. It only means that 
if the risks of imbalances, or serious economic problems are considerable, the 
necessary adjustments and reforms must be introduced in order to strengthen the 
sustainability of currency parities.   
34 Strictly speaking, the Council determined only the bilateral central rates (and not the 
final conversion rates) when decided, in May 1998, which member states will adopt the 
euro from 1.1.1999. This was necessary for technical reasons as explained in the Joint 
Communique issued on 2 May 1998: “Since the ECU was a currency basket, which 
included the Danish krone, the Greek drachma and the pound sterling, it was not 
possible to announce before the end of 1998 the irrevocable conversion rates at which 
the euro would be substituted for the participating currencies. However, it is possible 
to announce the bilateral rates of the currencies participating in the euro area which 
will be used on 31 December 1998 in computing the exchange rates of the official ECU 
and thus in computing the irrevocable euro conversion rates for these currencies.” Of 
course, no such technical constraints existed when a decision was taken about 
Greece’s participation in the euro area, as the euro was already in place.   
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considerably reduced and, secondly, how to deal with such massive 
capital movements when they, eventually, occur. 
 
Speculative capital movements had often been associated with currency 
instability and crises under fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes. 
This was the case within the EMS in the past, as well as in many 
instances elsewhere in the world.  
 
How can capital mobility be best managed within the ERM II framework 
and what are the policy measures which could turn capital movements 
from an adversary to an ally in the convergence effort? Some tentative 
answers can be given to this question on the basis of past experience 
within the EMS as well as from international evidence. They include the 
following elements: 
 
• (i) Sound and sustainable economic, monetary and fiscal policies 
in order to enhance confidence in the prospects of the economy 
and avoid a situation which might incite an attack on the 
currency. A solid financial system and implementation of reforms 
in the labour, goods and services markets are indispensable 
elements of the policy package. 
 
• (ii) Clear and unambiguous commitment to the objectives of 
convergence and euro membership and readiness to take 
corrective measures, if needed, to ensure their achievement; 
capacity to mobilize all available policy instruments to this end. 
  
• (iii) Transparency in economic policy-making and openness in 
dealing with Community and international institutions, the 
business community and the general public.  
 
The factors under (i) above are indispensable elements of a consistent 
and credible convergence strategy. Also, readiness to adapt and take 
corrective measures is also essential; in this respect, the signals 
conveyed by capital movements and asset prices may be useful as early 
indicators of emerging difficulties. Furthermore, transparency and 
openness mentioned under (iii) above, reduce uncertainty about policies 
and intentions of policymakers and affect positively expectations 
(important factors in modern economies) exerting, thus, a stabilizing 
influence.  
 
As already noted, the ERM II provides a helpful framework in limiting 
speculative pressures –notably through the wider fluctuation margins 
which make one-way bets less likely - compared to the earlier, pre-1993 
EMS. Furthermore, by focusing on the implementation of sound and 
sustainable policies, including structural reforms, the mechanism 
encourages timely policy action and adjustments, reducing thus the risk 
of central rates misalignments. Both these elements enhance the 
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usefulness of the ERM II as a tool to streamline stabilization and 
convergence.  
 
In addition to appropriate economic policies, a sound financial system is 
necessary in order to limit the risks of instability or delays in the 
convergence process. A fragile financial system may prove a serious 
constraint if, for example, a policy of high interest rates considered 
necessary to defend the currency could create problems for domestic 
banks in case of weak balance sheets. 
 
Extensive borrowing in foreign currency by the banking and/or the 
corporate sector, not hedged or unmatched by receipts in foreign 
exchange (natural hedge) could also create problems for the banking 
sector, and affect the performance of the economy more generally, 
putting at risk the implementation of the convergence process and 
exchange rate policy. Although enterprises make their commercial and 
financial decisions freely and assume the corresponding risks, vigilance 
should be exercised the potential impact of foreign currency exposure on 
the corporate sector and, in turn, on the banking system. 
 
The above constitute indispensable elements of policies aimed to 
contribute to a safe drive towards EMU. They are, therefore, preventive 
factors of destabilizing capital movements. However, speculative capital 
movements may occur for a number or reasons, including inappropriate 
policies, international factors beyond the control of the authorities or a 
combination of factors. See Gibson H. and Tsakalotos E. [2003] for a 
discussion of this issue.  
 
 The authorities should be in a position to cope with speculative capital 
movements when they occur35.  Indeed, the authorities are not deprived 
of means of action in such situations despite general perceptions to the 
contrary. Experience shows that monetary authorities do have ways to 
dealing effectively with the undesirable effects of massive capital 
movements, “speculative” or other. Such instruments include, in 
                                            
35 It may be useful in this regard to clarify that Community legislation, which provides 
for complete freedom of capital movements [CM] within the EU does not distinguish 
between “speculative” and “non-speculative” CM [although it recognized -in the CM 
liberalization process within the EU, in the past, and in negotiations with associated 
countries-the different implications of each category of CM by favouring the 
liberalization of trade-related and long-term CM ahead of purely financial and short-
term transactions]. However, for analytical reasons, and because of the policy 
implications of certain capital movements, a distinction of capital operations may be 
useful. For example, inflow of capital to domestic debt securities in order to profit from 
high interest rates cannot be considered as purely speculative, neither capital outflow 
from financial placements denominated in a given currency when investors perceive a 
risk of depreciation of the currency. “Pure” speculative capital movements can be 
considered those involving borrowing in domestic currency with simultaneous selling 
against foreign exchange, in an attempt to force a devaluation of the domestic 
currency. If the devaluation takes place, speculators repay the loan and gain the 
difference.  
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particular, interest rate changes, sterilization operations or imposition of 
reserve requirements and prudential measures within, of course, the 
margins allowed by Community law on free movement of capital and free 
provision of financial services.  
 
It is, however, true that some of such measures do not, usually, provide 
a lasting solution to the problem of destabilizing capital flows - which are 
often inherent to the convergence process. They, nevertheless, make 
possible to cope with a difficult situation, gaining time in order to 
develop more sustainable solutions, by adapting economic policies and 
improving the policy mix.  
 
The challenges monetary authorities face in dealing with massive capital 
movements largely emanate from the unwelcome effects, on monetary 
conditions and the economy, of measures taken to defend the exchange 
rate. Such difficulties arise from the well-known incompatibility of 
independent monetary policy with fixed exchange rates and free capital 
mobility. This implies, in practice, that interest rates are primarily used 
to defend the exchange rate -notably in case of massive capital outflows- 
and cannot at the same time be used to adapt monetary policy to 
changing economic and monetary conditions, if such actions are not 
compatible with the exchange rate target.  
 
Also, in the case of massive capital inflow pushing for an appreciation of 
the currency, a reduction in interest rates to render domestic financial 
assets less attractive to foreign investors, can lead to an undesirable 
loosening of monetary conditions. The unwelcome effects of capital 
inflows on the monetary base and liquidity can be met by sterilization 
operations, through the sale of domestic for foreign currency securities. 
Changes in reserve requirements can also be used. Despite the limits 
and cost of sterilization operations, they are useful tools in the short-
term enabling the authorities to gain time and adapt the policy-mix. The 
main drawbacks of sterilization are firstly, the fact that, if successful in 
absorbing excess liquidity, it maintains domestic interest rates 
unchanged continuing thus to attract foreign capital, perpetuating the 
excess liquidity problem which gave rise to the sterilization operations in 
the first place. Furthermore, sterilization may be costly as replacement 
of domestic securities for foreign currency securities in the balance sheet 
of the central bank implies loss of interest revenue for the bank.  
 
Although both situations pose difficult problems for the monetary 
authorities, massive capital outflows present often a more acute 
problem, as may lead to the depletion of foreign reserves to defend the 
currency and they also necessitate rises, sometimes sharp, in interest 
rates, an operation that could adversely affect economic activity and the 
financial situation of companies and financial institutions.36 
                                            
36 It might look somewhat paradoxical, but the more sophisticated is its financial 
sector, the more exposed seems to be the currency of the member state concerned to 
speculative attacks, as it is more easy to borrow the domestic currency in domestic or 
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In the event of balance of payments difficulties, often taking the form of 
massive capital outflows and pressure on the currency in the foreign 
exchange markets, member State(s) concerned may use the Community 
balance of payments facility foreseen in Article 120 of the Treaty. The 
facility, providing medium-term financial support accompanied by 
economic conditions, may be used only by members with a derogation 
(i.e. member states not having adopted the euro) as participants in the 
monetary union are by definition not concerned, individually, by balance 
of payments problems37. An analysis of the BOP facility is provided in 
Papaspyrou (1993). 
 
In conclusion, free movement of capital provides useful and timely 
information to the authorities about inconsistent or unsustainable 
policies enabling timely action to remedy the situation. To fully exploit 
such precious early signals, a policy of openness and transparency 
about policies, data and future plans should be in place. This includes 
full co-operation and openness, including about eventual difficulties. 
Such openness and transparency avoids incomplete information, which 
often leads to mis-information. As expectations are central in the 
operation of today’s internationalized economies, where the role of 
financial markets is crucial, the best way to stabilize expectations and 
render them a stabilizing instrument is openness and transparency.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The experience from the successful convergence efforts of existing 
members of the euro area, in particular that of Greece, the most recent 
member, and international evidence on the interaction of economic 
policy and capital movements, could provide helpful lessons for new EU 
members in preparing for EMU.  
 
                                                                                                                                 
offshore financial markets (see footnote no. 23). It was for this reason (regardless of 
other aspects related, for example, to how strong was the commitment to euro 
membership) easier to attack the sterling pound during the 1992 EMS currency crisis 
than other currencies; an additional argument, in the same vein, is that a member 
state with an international financial centre, such as London, is very reluctant to 
introduce measures which, although not incompatible with rules about freedom of 
capital movements or prudential ones, could be perceived as restrictive by the 
international financial community and thus not compatible with the reputation of an 
open financial centre. It emerges from the above that it is excessive to evoke, as some 
analysts do, the sterling pound’s example during the 1992/93 EMS crisis, as a typical 
case of speculative attack related to risks acceding countries could face during their 
participation in the ERM II. 
 
37 The facility for Medium-Term Financial Assistance for member states balance of 
payments (Council Regulation No 332/2002, 28.2.2002) should be distinguished from 
the Very Short-Term Financing Facility, which is part of the ERM II arrangements and 
whose purpose is intervention in euro and in the participating non-euro area 
currencies. 
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An essential element of a strategy towards EMU pursued by existing 
members of the euro area –element which remains at the core of the 
present institutional and policy framework- was its comprehensive 
character, as the respect of the exchange rate stability criterion was 
pursued as one component of a coherent approach incorporating targets 
for the government balance and debt, the inflation rate and the interest 
rate. The convergence effort was also supported by reforms in the 
labour, goods and capital markets. It emerges from past experience that 
a strong commitment to the objective of euro membership reduces 
uncertainty, mobilizes human and financial resources to the goals set 
and stabilizes expectations. Also, the right setting of priorities in 
pursuing the convergence criteria ensures positive interactions and 
facilitates achievement of targets set. Furthermore, the maintenance of a 
safety margin in reducing interest rates, the appropriate sequencing of 
capital movements liberalization and a sound financial system are 
factors contributing to continued progress in the convergence process by 
limiting the risk of reversals, that may prove destabilizing.  
 
The ERM II should be seen as a mechanism testing the consistency of 
policies, encouraging necessary adjustment and helping to achieve 
convergence. It provides, both, more flexibility and stability compared 
with earlier versions of the mechanism. ERM II rules are flexible enough 
to accommodate a number of acceding countries’ exchange rate regimes 
except those of free floating and currency boards based on currencies 
other than the euro. It is noted in this respect that the alleged merits of 
free floating regimes -notably the extra degree of monetary and economic 
policy freedom- must be carefully weighed against the risks involved, i.e. 
loss of external nominal anchor and the risk that the exchange rate 
drifts away from fundamentals. The choice of exchange rate regime 
should be made, in each case, not on grounds of facility -e.g. to avoid 
the ERM II constraint or because the current regime served well the 
country concerned in the past- but only as part of a plan to achieve 
specific policy objectives, before opting for ERM II membership. 
 
Decisions on the timing of ERM II participation will largely depend on 
whether convergence and structural reform is well on track, or 
important uncertainties remain which might necessitate sizeable 
economic policy adjustments, including in the exchange rate. In 
acceding countries, the sustainability of progress made in these areas 
has to be tested under the competitive pressure of full membership in 
the EU and, further, under the rigorous framework of ERM II. Therefore, 
in taking a decision about the timing of ERM II participation, the 
situation in each country in the above areas will have to be carefully 
examined. It cannot be excluded that in certain cases, a delay of entry 
would be to the benefit of both the country concerned -by allowing a 
higher degree of freedom in setting policy priorities- while also 
preserving the credibility of the ERM II.  
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There is no, a priori, optimal duration period for ERM II participation, 
between the two-year legal minimum and a longer time period. The 
decisive element should be progress made by the member-state 
concerned in achieving sustainable convergence. However, the 
participation period should not be too long as, in such a case, there is a 
risk that convergence momentum is lost and the commitment to the 
euro may fade.  
 
Macroeconomic stabilization, pursued in order to achieve the nominal 
convergence criteria, is also compatible with real convergence i.e. the 
capacity to achieve, in parallel, high enough rates of real GDP growth 
rates in order to maintain progress towards real convergence. 
Experience has shown that the two processes can be mutually re-
enforcing, notably if the process of nominal convergence acquires 
enhanced credibility, affecting thus the formation of key variables such 
as interest rates, wages and prices. Moreover, convergence of Acceding 
Countries economies to the EU average will be supported by funds 
allocated through the Community budget. 
 
Risks of destabilising capital movements can be considerably reduced by 
the implementation of sound and sustainable economic policies; 
furthermore, transparency and openness in economic policy reduce 
uncertainty about current policies and future plans, contributing to a 
stable economic and financial environment. Capital movements provide 
also useful and timely information to the authorities about inconsistent 
and unsustainable policies, enabling timely corrective action. However, 
massive short-term capital movements may occur and the authorities 
should be in a position to cope with such a situation. Monetary 
authorities have at their disposal ways to deal effectively with the 
undesirable effects of massive capital movements; such instruments 
include, in particular, interest rate changes and sterilization operations. 
Such measures may not constitute lasting solutions but make it 
possible to cope with a difficult situation, gaining time in order to 
develop more sustainable solutions by adapting economic policies and 
improving the policy-mix. 
 
Finally, available evidence from the operation of monetary union so far - 
notably the persistence of relatively high inflation, fiscal imbalances  and 
public debt in some member states - suggest that the effort to improve 
the performance of the economy and its competitiveness must be a 
permanent process and not be limited to satisfying the Maastricht  
convergence criteria.  
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Annex 1  
   
 
Key dates of European Monetary Integration 
 
 
1969: 2 December: The Council adopts the Werner Plan to strengthen coordination of    
economic policies.  
1972: 10 April: Balse Agreement sets up the ‘Snake’: The Six (B,D,F,IT,L,NL) agree to 
limit the margin of fluctuation between their currencies to 2.25%. 
19 & 20 October: The Paris meeting of Heads of State and Government reaffirms 
the 1980 deadline for the achievement of EMU. 
1973: 3 April: Creation of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) 
1978: 6 & 7 July: The European Council meeting at Bremen agrees with the French-
German proposal to launch the European Monetary System (EMS) 
          5 December: The Brussels European Council decides to set up the EMS 
1979: 13 March: The EMS comes into force; the eight participating Member States (the 
UK stays outside) are required to maintain their exchange rates within a fluctuation 
margin of +-2.25% (+-6% for the lira). Creation of the European Currency Unit (ECU) 
1987: 1 July: The Single European Act, which reforms the EEC Treaty, comes into 
force. Its objective is the completion of the Internal market by the end of 1992. 
1988: 24 June: The Council Capital movements directive is adopted eliminating all 
restrictions by 1 July 1990, with temporary derogations for E, GR, IR and P. 
1989: 19 June: Peseta enters EMS exchange rate mechanism (ERM). 
26 & 27 June: Madrid European Council decides to convene an 
Intergovernmental Conference before 1990 on Economic and Monetary Union. 
1990:  1 July: The first phase of EMU comes into force. It involves the removal of most 
of remaining restrictions on capital movements, increased coordination of economic 
policies and more intensive cooperation between central banks. 
           6 October: Pound sterling enters ERM with a 6% fluctuation margin. 
1991; 9 & 10 December: Maastricht European Council reaches agreement on draft 
Treaty on European Union: completion of EMU and introduction of the single European 
currency by 1999, at the latest. 
1992; 4 April: Escudo enters ERM with a 6% fluctuation margin. 
          17 September: Intense speculative pressure forced the UK and the Italian 
authorities to suspend participation of pound and the lira in the ERM. 
1993: 1 January: The Single Market enters into force. 
          2 August: Fluctuation margins of ERM currencies widened [temporarily] to 15%. 
          1 November: The Treaty on European Union enters into force. 
1994: 1 January: Stage II of EMU begins and European Monetary Institute is 
established. 
1995: 9 January: Austrian schilling enters the ERM. 
          15 & 16 December: Madrid European Council names the European currency unit 
‘Euro’ and confirms the introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999. 
1996: 14 October: Finnish markka enters the ERM 
25 November: the Italian lira rejoins the ERM. 
1998: 1 June: The European Central Bank (ECB) is established. The EMI, having 
competed its tasks, ceases to exist.   
1999: 1 January: the third and final stage of EMU enters into force with the irrevocable 
fixing of the exchange rates of the currencies of 11 Member States and the conduct of a 
single monetary policy under the responsibility of the ECB.  
2001:  January: Greece enters the third stage of EMU and adopts the euro. 
2002:1 January: Introduction of euro notes and coins. 
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Annex 2 
Greece: Monetary policy strategy during 1995-2000 
 
In Greece, a significant tightening of monetary policy has taken place in 1994, 
which laid down the foundation for the disinflation of 1995 and beyond. The 
tightening of monetary policy was part of a re-orientation of economic and 
monetary policies specified in the revised convergence programme of Greece, 
1994-99. To focus expectations, beginning in 1995, the Bank of Greece 
adopted a “hard drachma policy” under which the exchange rate was used as a 
nominal anchor. For the first time the Bank announced a specific exchange 
rate target.38 
In 1995, the Bank of Greece announced that the main objective of 
monetary policy would be to contribute to a further deceleration of inflation, 
while at the same time supporting the anticipated growth in economic activity.  
To attain this goal the Bank set two intermediate targets (i) to limit the year-on-
year depreciation of the drachma against the ECU to 3 percent, a rate that 
would not fully offset inflation differential between Greece and its EU partners, 
and (ii) to contain monetary expansion, as measured by the growth rate of M3, 
to 7-9 per cent. The Bank aimed to reduce inflation to 8 percent in 1995, from 
10.8 per cent in 1994. To this end the exchange rate target was assigned 
preeminence. The Bank also monitored the evolution of supplementary 
indicators, including M4 and total domestic credit. In the event, M3 rose by 
10.3 per cent in 1995, but the exchange rate target and the supplementary 
indicators were attained. Inflation, at 8.9 per cent, was somewhat above the 
Bank’s objective.  
Similar objectives were set for 1996 and 1997. Thus, during the first 
three years of the hard-drachma policy, inflation was more than halved. 
Indicative of the stance of monetary policy and of the large, but declining (as a 
per cent of GDP), fiscal deficits in the three years through 1997, nominal and 
real interest rates remained at very high levels. Correspondingly the real 
effective exchange rate (measured on the basis of relative unit labour costs) 
appreciated by about 17 per cent, which may have reduced competitiveness. 
Although inflation fell sharply, real growth accelerated. Real GDP growth 
averaged about 2.8 per cent during 1995-97 compared with 1 per cent during 
1991-94. 
No specific inflation target was set for 1998 in view of the lags with 
which monetary policy affects inflation and of the uncertain impact of the 
devaluation on inflation. Instead the Bank stated that it would seek to achieve 
price stability by end-1999. Its intermediate target would be to maintain a 
stable exchange rate defined as an average annual exchange rate within 2.5 
per cent of the central rate. In striking a balance between the objectives of 
disinflation and exchange rate stability, the Bank clearly affirmed that priority 
in policy implementation would be given to achieving the inflation target and, 
consequently, the drachma could appreciate to a point outside the narrow 
margins of fluctuation. 
                                            
38 The decision to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor was, in part, based on 
the belief that the adoption of a visible anchor could enhance the credibility of the 
disinflation effort. By pegging the exchange rate to the currency of a low-inflation 
country, inflation could be brought down rapidly, because (1) the traded goods 
component of the price level can be stabilized, (2) of the attendant restraint imposed on 
wage-setting and price-setting behaviour, and (3) of the restraint imposed on aggregate 
demand, especially government spending 
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Annex 3 
 
 
 
 
     Greece: 
    Key dates in the convergence effort towards the euro 
 
 
 
1994        Revised convergence programme of Greece, 1994-99 
                      First update of convergence programme, 1994-99. 
    1997 confirmed as year for meeting convergence criteria            
1995        Announcement of “hard drachma” policy 
                                  
1998 March 16  Entry of GRD in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS                    
            at a central rate of 357 GRD per ECU corresponding to a                      
         12.3% devaluation against the previous exchange rate.  
1998 June            New convergence programme of Greece, 1998-2001,              
taking account of the conditions created by the entry of   the 
GRD into the ERM and setting 1999 as target-year for meeting 
convergence criteria. 
 
1999 Jan 1           Starting date of third stage of EMU. Monetary Union   
                             entered into force with 11 founding members. The ERM II 
                             replaced the ERM of the EMS. The GRD joined the ERM II.  
 
2000 Jan 17         GRD central rate was revalued by 3.5% to 340.75 GRD per             
                              euro in order to limit the degree of depreciation that      
                              would be required for the market rate to reach its central  
                              rate. 
 
2000 June 19       The Council decided that Greece fulfils the necessary   
                              conditions for the adoption of the single currency 
                              from 1 January 2001. 
 
2001 Jan. 1          Greece joined the euro area at a central rate of 340.75  
                             GRD per euro. 
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Annex 4 
 
 
 
   Exchange Rate Criterion 
 
 
Article 121 (1), third indent, of the Treaty requires: 
 
“The observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two 
years, without devaluing against the currency of any other Member State.”. 
 
Article 3 of the Protocol on the convergence criteria referred to in Article 121 (1) 
of the Treaty stipulates that: 
 
“The criterion on participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European 
Monetary System referred to in the third indent of Article 121 (1) of this Treaty 
shall mean that a Member State has respected the normal fluctuation margins 
provided for by the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System without severe tensions for at least two years before the examination. In 
particular, the Member State shall not have devalued its currency’s bilateral 
central rate against any other Member State’s currency on its own initiative for 
the same period”. 
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Annex 5 
 
    Exchange rate and monetary regimes in Accession countries 
 
          Exchange rate strategy    Currency        Features    
 
Cyprus      Peg to the euro, with +-15%       Cyprus pound   The CP has de facto 
  Fluctuation bands      fluctuated within a range 
of +-1.1% during the    last 
two years 
Bulgaria     Currency board to the euro        Bulgarian lev     Introduced in 1997 
  
Czech       Free float             Czech koruna     Inflation targeting  
Republic         25-45 by end-2005 
 
Estonia      Currency board to the euro        Estonian kroon   Introduced in 1992  
 
Hungary    Peg to the euro, with +-15%      Hungarian forint   ER regime combined 
fluctuation bands with inflation targeting: 
 2.5-4.5% by end 2003 
 
Latvia       Peg to the SDR (euro weight      Latvian lat    ER band +-1% 
       29%) 
 
Lithuania   Currency board to the euro         Lithuanian litas    Introduced in 1994; 
Repegged from the US 
dollar to the euro in 
February 2002 
 
Malta        Peg to a basket             Maltese lira     Currency basket  
    (euro:70%, US dollar, 
     pound sterling) 
     ER band: +-0.25% 
 
Poland        Free float               Polish zloty      Inflation targeting: 3% 
     with tolerance +-1 pp 
     by end-2003. 
 
Romania    Managed float   Romanian leu      Currency basket 
(US dollar, euro) is used 
informally as reference 
 
Slovakia     Managed float              Slovakian koruna Hybrid strategy   
             Combined with   
              implicit inflation 
              Targeting 
 
Slovenia    Managed float   Slovenian tolar     Prominent role 
             of monetary   
             Aggregates; the euro 
             Is used informally 
As reference    currency  
___________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: ECB Annual Report 2002, based on IMF and national central banks 
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